Turning a Blind Eye to Genocide: The Response and Approach of European Union to the Situation of the Rohingya Minority in Myanmar

Executive Summary The Rohingya, a Muslim minority in Myanmar, have suffered decades of systemic discrimination, statelessness, and targeted violence. The crisis escalated significantly in 2017 when the Myanmar military launched brutal "clearance operations" that forced over 700,000 Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh. Despite widespread international condemnation including the recognition of ethnic cleansing by the United Nations and various human rights organizations, the European Union has not officially recognized these acts as genocide. Its response has remained limited and inconsistent, which stands in contrast to its self-identification as a normative power committed to human rights, international law, and human dignity. While the EU has imposed sanctions and an arms embargo, credible reports indicate that European-made military equipment continues to reach Myanmar through indirect trade routes. This undermines the EU's credibility and highlights a concerning contrast between its stated values and actual practices. Economic interests and trade partnerships often weaken its commitment to human rights. A more coherent, values-driven economic strategy is therefore urgently required. This policy paper focuses specifically on the economic dimension of the EU's foreign policy, arguing that economic tools and trade relations represent some of its most potent instruments of influence. Drawing on historical lessons from other contexts, such as the EU's delayed and ineffective response to atrocities in Bosnia during the 1990s, the paper stresses the need for more decisive and proactive engagement in Myanmar. This paper outlines three policy options for the EU: (1) maintain the status quo with limited sanctions and aid; (2) adopt a "carrot" strategy by offering incentives for progress on minority rights and humanitarian access; or (3) adopt a "stick" approach with stronger sanctions and possible withdrawal of Myanmar’s EBA trade benefits. The recommended approach is to combine both incentives and pressure. The EU should start by offering economic benefits that depend on real improvements in the treatment of the Rohingya. At the same time, it should clearly state that if there is no progress, stronger sanctions and trade restrictions will follow. By using its economic power in line with its core values, the EU can help stop the persecution of the Rohingya and support their safe and dignified return, with legal rights and protection guaranteed.

Context

Minority groups often represent the most vulnerable features of society, particularly when their identities clash with those of the prevailing majority. The Rohingya people, a Muslim minority group in Myanmar have long faced this tension, culminating in one of the gravest human rights crises of our time. Living primarily in Rakhine State along Myanmar’s western coastline bordering Bangladesh, the Rohingya have distinct traditions, beliefs, and a language similar to Chittagonian, spoken in southern Bangladesh. However, they are ethnically and religiously distinct from Myanmar’s majority Buddhist Bamar population. This difference has made them targets of systemic discrimination, exclusion, and ultimately, violence, as the state has attempted to erase their identity and deny them basic rights (Amnesty International. n.d.).

Picture 1: Rakhine State The Rohingya crisis has escalated to such extremes that even the International Court of Justice ruled Myanmar must take urgent measures to protect the group from acts of genocide. Yet, nearly seven years later, no significant progress has been made toward accountability, repatriation, or restoring basic rights. The military junta's return to power in 2021 has only worsened conditions. This policy paper highlights the limitations of the EU’s response to the crisis in Myanmar and proposes alternative approaches through which the EU could more effectively leverage its economic influence to support meaningful improvements for the Rohingya minority. Genesis of the Conflict through the Legal Lens Everything started back when Myanmar was colonized by Britain in the 19th century, and during British rule, many Muslims from Bengal (now Bangladesh) migrated to Rakhine for labor, especially in agriculture. The British governed Burma as a province of British India, blurring the borders between ethnic groups and this migration and British favoritism toward some Muslim groups sparked hatred among local Buddhists. After gaining independence in 1948, Myanmar did not recognize the Rohingya as a native ethnic group which remained until today. Some Rohingya at that time were allowed to vote and even held political office, but tensions remained high. A major turning point in the legal exclusion of the Rohingya occurred in 1982 with the passage of Myanmar’s Citizenship Law denying citizenship to the Rohingya unless they could prove ancestral ties before 1823 which was at the end a near-impossible requirement (Zargar, 2022). They were stateless and without legal recognition, they have been subject to systemic discrimination in areas such as freedom of movement, land ownership, education, healthcare, political participation, and access to justice.

The situation took a devastating turn on August 25, 2017, when a Rohingya militant group called also the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacked several police stations and an army base in Rakhine State, killing about a dozen security officers. In response, the Myanmar military launched massive "clearance operations" aimed at Rohingya communities. According to survivors, satellite images, and independent investigations, these operations included mass killings, rape, torture, and the burning of entire villages. In just a few weeks, over 700,000 Rohingya fled to neighboring Bangladesh, joining more than 200,000 others who had already escaped earlier waves of violence. This brought the total number of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh to nearly one million (Hodzic, 2024). The speed, scale, and brutality of the military's actions shocked the world and led to widespread international condemnation. Reports from the United Nations, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and others concluded that these actions likely amounted to crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. A 2018 UN fact-finding mission even described the military's actions as being carried out with "genocidal intent" but what about the European Union? International Legal and Political Response The brutal events of 2017 quickly caught the world’s attention. The international community reacted with humanitarian aid, strong criticism, and legal steps. In November 2019, The Gambia, supported by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), brought a case against Myanmar to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), accusing the country of breaking the 1948 Genocide Convention (ICJ: The Gambia v. Myanmar. n.d.). The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has not yet officially said that Myanmar committed genocide against the Rohingya. But in January 2020, the court said that the genocide claims seem believable and serious. Because of that, it ordered Myanmar to take steps to protect the Rohingya (ICJ: The Gambia v. Myanmar. n.d.). These steps included stopping any acts of violence, keeping all evidence safe, and regularly reporting to the court about what they are doing. The case made headlines not only for its content but also for the person who represented Myanmar. Representing Myanmar at the Court was Aung San Suu Kyi, formerly celebrated as a pro-democracy leader and recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize. She was one of the country's two most powerful figures, even though she held "only" the position of State Counsellor even though she was elected to become a president but because of a specific clause in Myanmar's constitution, that prohibits anyone with close family members holding foreign citizenship and since her husband and two sons are British citizens, it disqualified her from the role. Years ago, people called her “the conscience of Burma” (Čorej, 2019) but now, instead of speaking out against the violence, she defended the military. She said the army was only responding to attacks from Rohingya militants and claimed there was no plan to destroy the group. She admitted that maybe too much force had been used, but rejected the idea that this was genocide. It was hard to believe that someone who had once fought so strongly for human rights was now justifying mass killings. As Slovak journalist Tomáš Čorej (2019) wrote, her story is a sad example of how power can change people, and how ideals can be pushed aside for political reasons. In 1991, she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for her nonviolent struggle for democracy and human rights. Nowadays she argues that “The situation in Rakhine State is complex. Its problems go far back in history and have always been extremely serious.” In response to allegations of extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, and the burning of Rohingya homes, she claimed that “the attacks were not coordinated by the state.” She continued by comparing the crisis to other conflicts: “This is an internal issue that tragically led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Muslims – just like the armed conflict in Croatia led to the deaths of ethnic Croats and later ethnic Serbs” (Čorej, 2019). Despite clear evidence of worsening conditions for the Rohingya, the European Union has struggled to respond with a coherent and impactful strategy. Statelessness remains a key obstacle to justice, repatriation, and protection. The Myanmar government continues to deny the Rohingya citizenship, and without it, they remain excluded from civil rights, political participation, and legal protection. UN and other humanitarian organizations have expressed concern over the deteriorating conditions and the lack of a clear path to citizenship or safe repatriation for the Rohingya. ​Since the military coup in February 2021, the situation has only gotten worse. The same armed forces responsible for the ethnic cleansing in 2017 took full control of the country, overthrew the elected government and took full control and even detained the former leader Aung San Suu Kyi. The legal and political environment for the Rohingya has since deteriorated further. Today, nearly one million Rohingya live in camps in Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh, in what’s now the largest refugee settlement in the world (CBS News, 2022). The few Rohingya who are still in Rakhine State live under what the UN has called “apartheid-like conditions.” Without citizenship, they live in what human rights groups describe as “open-air prisons,” restricted from movement, access to healthcare, or any form of normal life.

Picture 2: Cox’s Bazar

The refugees note they will not return unless they are assured safety, citizenship, and fundamental rights—but Myanmar has declined to agree to any of these conditions. Bangladesh's Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, insists that "The Rohingya are nationals of Myanmar and they have to be taken back" (Alam, J. 2022). Although Bangladesh has received international recognition for accommodating such a large number of refugees, it has also faced backlash for keeping them confined in reinforced camps and preventing them from working. "Bangladesh is focused on repatriation of the refugees, and I don't think they want to make the camps any more comfortable," said an associate worker who requested anonymity, as reported by CBS News (2022). There was also significant criticism over the government's choice to move thousands of Rohingya refugees to the isolated island of Bhasan Char, despite safety concerns and allegedly against their wishes.

Picture 3: Bhasan Char

Even though there is strong evidence of genocide and crimes against humanity, legal action has been slow and incomplete, revealing serious gaps in both the global and European Union’s response. The International Court of Justice has opened proceedings, but enforcement mechanisms are weak and limited progress also when the same Court has launched an investigation, but it narrowly focuses on cross-border deportations rather than the full scale of atrocities. While the Rohingya continue to lack citizenship, they are vulnerable to violence, forced migration, and marginalization. Why does the EU respond with urgency to some crises, yet remain passive in the face of ethnic cleansing and statelessness? Such inconsistency raises serious questions about its moral credibility.

Analytical Framework

Respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and human rights, including the rights of individuals belonging to minorities, are the core values of the European Union. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union recognizes human dignity, freedom, equality, and solidarity as fundamental values, and it holds the same legal weight as the Treaty of Lisbon. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) serves as an important international legal instrument that asserts fundamental rights and freedoms. Based on these values, the European Union's concept of a normative power is introduced and suggests a push of influence in promoting the values in world politics. “The term 'normative power' is often used in connection with the European Union. It implies that the EU has both been constructed upon certain values, thus has specific ideational guidelines to regulate its internal functioning, and actively tries to promote these on the world stage” (Pienkina, 2023). The EU has committed to supporting Myanmar's democratic transition, peace, and prosperity, and it has actively engaged in democratic promotion. All in all, the Union seeks to set a good example for the rest of the world by advocating for generally appealing ideas and concepts, such as democracy, the rule of law, and human rights” (Pienkina, 2023). Therefore, it has set definitions and mechanisms in diverse fields such as genocide. In the Present Genocide Convention in the Article 2. genocide means “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” (United Nations, 1948). Committed in time of Peace or in time of war, genocide is recognized as a crime under international law, where the Genocide Convention undertakes to prevent and to punish regardless of the status: rulers, public officials, private individuals. According to the “normative power” and its external policy tools of the EU, it should be responsible, in theory, for responding based on its commitment to the promotion of its key values. However, its response has been multifaceted. Despite its imposition of an arms embargo against Myanmar, the trading partners of the EU, such as China, Russia, India, and Israel, are unofficially reported to export European equipment to Myanmar. By Myanmar using the European equipment, the EU is indirectly supporting the Rohingya genocide (Cappaert & Qu, n.d.). Although the EU has imposed restrictive measures, such as sanctions, it continues to engage with them. The EU's imposition of sanctions and its arms embargo refers to influencing international affairs through non-military means, such as trade and diplomacy. Duchene (1973) argued that world cooperation based on economics would be a better means of promoting global stability than using military power. Diffusing information, ideas, policies, and practices across different regions, sectors, and actors within and beyond the EU. Therefore, the exchange of goods, aid, trade, or technical assistance may be the result of the carrot and stick approach, involving financial rewards and economic sanctions. Even though these principles and policies are broad, they demonstrate the EU's fundamental rights and values both internally and externally. The EU is interested and engages in Myanmar through economic and political means. “There is a lot of potential in the country. There is a low level of development and high potential, both in raw materials and in human resources” (Baker, 2012). Myanmar is a trading partner of the EU, and since 2013, the EU became the third-largest trade partner of Myanmar by 2019 (Poletti & Sicurelli, 2022). Therefore, the EU is shaping the political interests and values of Myanmar through economic tools.

Stakeholders in Conflict Transformation

The Rohingya crisis is a humanitarian tragedy, as well as a big test of modern society, whether there is commitment towards refugee protection and minority rights internationally. The fact that the consequences are that minorities are vulnerable, and often suffer marginalization, forced migration or violence, makes this conflict extremely relevant even nowadays. Two main groups of stakeholders are primary ones, who remain directly affected by this crisis. These are foremost the Rohingya people themselves – refugees, victims of abuse, violence and displacement in the centre of this humanitarian catastrophe. Their urgent needs include restoration of citizenship rights, international protection and overall safety. Closely tied to their fate are the host communities in Bangladesh, particularly in Cox’s Bazar, where almost a million of Rohingya refugees reside in overcrowded, not very resource rich camps. However, Bangladesh faces economic and social pressures, so its ability to continue such a large displaced population is very limited (Kamruzzaman, 2022). Another actor in this crisis is Tatmadaw. Myanmar’s military force, which has historically oppressed the Rohingya minority. The military regime has denied their ethnicity, took their citizenship and violated their fundamental rights. Their actions affect the trajectory of the conflict, and rejection of their actions is a big obstacle in conflict resolution. (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2018). Beyond their military influence, the Tatmadaw also holds significant economic power, with military leaders and generals controlling many important business sectors, such as MEHL, or MEC, which operates across a broad spectrum of industries. There are so far up to 130 uncovered businesses, including manufacturing, mining, telecommunications, banks, travel agencies and many more. The Tatmadaw uses these businesses to enrich themselves and finance the genocide (Justice for Myanmar 2021). ARSA has played a controversial role in the conflict. It was originally formed to defend the rights of the Rohingya people, but attacks on Myanmar’s security forces in 2017 prompted a brutal operation by the Tatmadaw, which made the crisis even worse and they got classified as a terrorist group, which worked as a great excuse for the attack from Tatmadaw (Lee, 2021). Beyond these primary stakeholders, there is a broader category of secondary stakeholders, who are not directly involved in the conflict but influence its progress. The Government of Bangladesh, for example, is trying to balance humanitarian help for Rohingya with its own domestic, economic and political pressures. Through international recognition for hosting and helping refugees, Bangladesh is aware that this situation is not a long-term solution. On the international side, legal institutions such as ICJ and ICC, have taken important steps toward accountability. The ICJ has the authority to determine whether Myanmar committed genocide but cannot prosecute individual wrongdoer. The ICC, on the other hand, focuses on the criminal responsibility of individuals, gathers evidence and enforce arrest warrants. Humanitarian organizations including the UNHCR, UNICEF or the WFP, provide critical aid to the refugee camps, advocate for their rights and ensure their access to health care or education (UNICEF 2025). However, regional bodies like ASEAN have played a very limited role, focusing narrowly on humanitarian assistance, without an official recognition for the ethnic cleansing. Moving forward, ASEAN must prioritize the protection of Rohingya people over regional unity. The European Union is another significant secondary stakeholder. While the EU has publicly condemned Myanmar's human rights violations, imposed sanctions on the military, its response has been widely criticised as limited and inadequate. The EU continues to refer to the situation only as a ‘crisis’ rather than admitting it is a genocide. Although it maintains an arms embargo against Myanmar, the country continues to acquire weapons from other suppliers, from countries like Russia or China. This illustrates how geopolitical and economic interests often take precedence over the defence of human rights. The EU’s intervention lacks strategy for a long–term problem solution, and fails to apply pressure on international weapons suppliers.

Precedents

Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro The plight of the Rohingya people in Myanmar has drawn global attention as one of the most severe humanitarian crises of the 21st century. Still, throughout recent history, numerous groups have suffered similar fates, where state or non-state actors have sought to destroy, displace, or fundamentally alter the identity of minority populations. For this part, we have chosen the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro since they share significant similarities with other proceedings brought under the Genocide Convention, particularly in its focus on state responsibility for mass atrocities against a specific ethnic or religious group. The Bosnia case involved allegations that a state either directly committed genocide or failed to prevent and punish such acts within its territory or under its influence. Cases were brought to the International Court of Justice, which was tasked with interpreting the obligations of states under the Genocide Convention and determining whether those obligations had been breached. In its 2007 judgment, the ICJ found that genocide had indeed occurred at Srebrenica (Bosnia and Herzegovina), marking the first time an International Court had recognized an act of genocide in Europe since the Second World War (ICJ, 2007). However, the Court did not find Serbia directly responsible for committing genocide. Instead, it concluded that Serbia had violated its obligation to prevent genocide and to cooperate in punishing those responsible, particularly by failing to apprehend and transfer individuals indicted for genocide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (Goldstone, 2008).

EU’s Role in Bosnia v. Serbia

The European Union played a significant background role in shaping the context of these proceedings and the post-conflict environment in the Western Balkans, even though it wasn't particularly a direct party to the International Court of Justice. Throughout and after the Bosnian War, the EU was actively engaged in diplomatic efforts to end hostilities, most notably through its involvement in peace negotiations and support for the Dayton Accords (Goldstone, 2008). The significant role of the EU was also to provide substantial financial and technical assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina, aiding in post-war reconstruction, institution-building, and the promotion of human rights and the rule of law. The EU consistently supported international justice mechanisms, such as the ICTY, and encouraged regional cooperation and reconciliation through its enlargement policy, which made progress towards EU membership contingent on addressing issues of justice and good neighbourly relations (Goldstone, 2008). Although the EU was not formally involved in the ICJ proceedings, its member states offered diplomatic and technical support to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the EU as a whole monitored and responded to the outcome, underlining the importance of justice and reconciliation in the region (Chandler, 2010). Thus, the EU’s multifaceted engagement contributed to the broader environment in which the case was brought and reflected its commitment to peace, stability, and the rule of law in the Western Balkans. The Negative Aspects of the Role of the EU The European Union’s involvement in the Bosnia and Serbia case is often criticised for several negative outcomes. One of the most significant issues was the imposition of an arms embargo, which intended to reduce violence. This action disadvantaged Bosnia by preventing it from acquiring weapons to defend itself, whereas Serbia retained much of the former Yugoslav military’s arsenal (Chandler, 2010). Additionally, the EU’s response to the escalating conflict was widely seen as slow and ineffective. The diplomatic efforts failed to prevent the outbreak of war and subsequent atrocities. The EU also struggled to prevent major human rights abuses due to under-resourced peacekeeping missions and a lack of decisive action. Political misjudgements, especially the premature recognition of new states without adequate preparation, contributed to wide instability (Chandler, 2010). Humanitarian aid efforts, though substantial, were often undermined by poor coordination and security challenges, limiting their effectiveness. These shortcomings have left a lasting impact on how the EU’s role in the region is perceived.

Policy Alternatives & Recommendation for Action

After sufficient contextual and analytical background, as well as overview of the involved stakeholders and comparable precedents, we now move to the last and most essential part of this policy paper. In the following paragraphs, the current policy as adopted by the EU towards the conflict should be first reviewed. Afterwards, three policy alternatives (including maintaining the status quo) should be presented and their possible outcomes should be considered. Last but not least, a clear recommendation for action for the EU and its specific steps will be stated. Current Policy Shortly after the escalation of the situation in August 2017 (see the first chapter), the EU as other international bodies passed a resolution condemning the acts of violence and human rights violations in particular to the Rohingya minority (European Parliament, 2017). Although the European Parliament called on the High Representative and member states to “significantly increase their pressure on Myanmar Government and security forces” (European Parliament, 2017), the EU rather concentrated on monetary aid. In 2017, the EU pledged a total of €51 million to the Rohingya refugee crisis, “allocating funds for host communities in Bangladesh, refugees arriving in Europe, and recovery efforts in Myanmar” (Baena, 2025, para. 12).

In reaction to the violations, the EU strengthened its arms embargo on Myanmar (introduced since 1996) and adopted targeted sanctions against particular people from its armed forces in 2018 (European Council, n.d.). In particular, the embargo was expanded to “a prohibition on the export of dual‐use goods, restrictions on the export of equipment for monitoring communications that might be used for internal repression, and on military training and military cooperation” (Poletti & Sicurelli, 2022, p. 48). Additionally, despite sanctioning 14 more police officials, the EU has restrained from more concrete measures until the coup d’état in 2021. Since then, the EU has adopted altogether eight packages of targeted sanctions, which encompass for instance travel bans, asset freeze, and prohibition of economic resources for the listed 106 individuals and 22 entities (Council of the European Union, n.d.). These have been lastly prolonged in April 2025 for another year. The EU has been extensively criticized for its lack of proper action apart from diplomatic pressure and humanitarian aid to improve the situation of the Rohingya minority in Myanmar (see Baena, 2025; Cappaert & Qu, 2018). Most critically is approached the fact that protection of human rights is anchored in the EU’s values, yet the gap between rethorics and reality seems to be insuperable. It is known, however, that the EU holds sufficient economic power over Myanmar – “in 2024, the EU ranked as Myanmar's fourth-largest trading partner, accounting for 10.3% of the country’s total trade in goods” (European Commission, n.d.-a, para. 3), crucially benefiting from the “Everything But Arms” (EBA) trading preferences scheme of the EU. Although withdrawing these preferences have been called for and even considered many times, as Poletti & Sicurelli (2022) argue in their article, “the political pressures from European importers and exporters, not to jeopardise trade relations with Myanmar, prevailed over the demands of European protectionist groups and NGOs advocating a tougher position” (p. 47). Thus, until today, Myanmar draws from the scheme’s advantages and the EU basically sustains the economy of a militant state responsible for serious crimes against humanity. Policy Alternatives and Maintaining the Status Quo What are, thus, the possible alternatives? In this paper, we believe that three main policies are considerable for the EU to be adopted. One of them being, naturally, maintaining the status quo. While the other two proposed follow the “carrot and stick” approach as known in international relations. In the following paragraphs, these policies and their consequences should be discussed. In terms of maintaining the status quo, the EU would only proceed with extension of the adopted arms embargo and targeted sanctions, while allocating some financial and humanitarian aid for the Rohingya refugees. However, despite the adopted arms embargo, “there are reports that Myanmar’s military has been using European equipment, which it appears could have been received through China, Russia, India, or Israel” (Cappaert & Qu, 2018, para. 10). At the same time, although the targeted sanctions are perceived as positive in terms of not being targeted towards the country’s population, the effects of asset freeze or travel bans for military leaders are negligible (Tattevin, 2022). Moreover, the financial and humanitarian aid, although appreciated and welcomed by the respective parties, is still considered limited to properly taking care of the Rohingya refugees (Cappaert & Qu, 2018) while also, in the broader picture, being perceived as mere “plaster” instead of proper solution. In general, as the EU’s economic ties with the country under the current military regime would not be constrained, the EU’s approach would be further criticized as hypocritical, prioritizing economic relationships before its core values. The proposed policy in line with the “carrots” approach is based on incentives and positive motivations towards the Myanmar responsibles for the Rohingya genocide. We believe that there is a possibility to use the economic ties as a leverage – essentially keeping them conditional on political reforms in the country, which would be in line with the EU’s commitment to support Myanmar’s transition towards democracy (see EEAS, 2018), as well as the humanitarian access to the country. As Doctors Without Borders (2024) report, the humanitarian presence in the country is very challenging, restricted and unsafe, while the Rohingya people have problems accessing basic health care needs due to “movement restrictions and lack of legal status” (para. 2). Through economic diplomacy, the EU’s economic soft power could be used to improve the situation of NGOs or UN/EU missions that provide on site humanitarian aid, while also pushing on the government for at least minor political changes. At the same time, EU’s international trade partners, all above in countries neighbouring Myanmar (for instance ASEAN) could be motivated and convinced to coordinate their economic, political, and military pressures (see Cappaert & Qu, 2018; Burma Campaign UK, 2023; Tattevin, 2022). Another proposed policy from our side follows the “sticks” approach, thus concentrating on rather more coercive measures. Both logical and desired is monitoring and enforcement of the targeted sanctions via more active engagement with NGOs in terms of precise mapping (Heiduk, 2018) and partners like the UK or USA in terms of target unification (Burma Campaign UK, 2023). Additionally, calls for sanctioning aviation fuel companies, whose supplies of fuel are used in air attacks on civilians (see BROUK, 2022; Burma Campaign UK, 2023; Burma Campaign UK, 2025), should be heard. As the global arms embargo seems not very realistic for now, the EU could at least “sanction Russian, Chinese, Indian and Pakistani companies supplying the Myanmar military with arms” (Burma Campaign UK, 2023, para. 20). Most importantly, the EU should use the economic leverage anchored in the EBA trade preference scheme, which Myanmar is benefiting from. As the EBA scheme is connected to “compliance with labor and human rights standards” (Baena, 2025, para. 15), its withdrawal “would showcase a value-based EU foreign policy” (Heiduk, 2018, p. 3). Additionally, it would hit Myanmar’s economy much more, then the European – while “the EU ranked as Myanmar's fourth-largest trading partner, (...) Myanmar was the EU’s 75th largest trading partner” (European Commission, n.d.-a, para. 3). However, there are serious concerns that a general withdrawal of the GSP would disproportionately affect women workers in the textile industry (Heiduk, 2018; Tattevin, 2022) and lead to job losses (Dvornichenko & Barskyy, 2020). A milder option would be “imposing sectorspecific EBA withdrawal” (Poletti & Sicurelli, 2022, p. 53), for instance in “sectors benefiting companies owned by members of the military” (Poletti & Sicurelli, 2022, p. 54), essentially exempting the textile industry.

Recommendation for Action

After presenting the possibilities, we would now like to appeal on the Council of the European Union, European Commission (EC), and the EU’s member states as such to take the following actions: Break away from the hypocrisy of the current approach and follow a combination of the “carrot and stick” approaches as discussed above. In terms of economic leverage, the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) as the configuration of the Council of the European Union chaired by the High Representative (HR) responsible for EU’ CSFP (European Union, n.d.) is called for taking the appropriate decisions. With a clear strategy and stance towards Myanmar defined in the CSFP, the EEAS as well as the EC can implement the decided foreign policy based on positive economic motivation towards Myanmar. If this “carrot” based approach in combination with the current policies does not bring any obviously positive results in terms of improving the situation of the Rohingya minority in Myanmar, the EU is called to take another step in the line of the “stick” approach. In terms of enforcement of existing sanctions, implementation of aviation fuel sanctions, or sanctioning the third parties’ companies (see chapter above), the EC together with the HR make proposals for the Council of the European Union, which is once again under the CSFP framework responsible for the appropriate decisions. Here, a unanimous decision from member states is necessary (European Commission, n.d.-b). Under the authorisation of the Council of the European Union, the EC by rule negotiates trade policies (European Commission, n.d.-c). The responsibility to monitor and the decision to withdraw or reassess the scope of the EBA trade preference also lies with the EC (GSP Platform, n.d.). Therefore, the call for complete or partial withdrawal of EBA towards Myanmar is directed to the EC as the first responsible institution in this matter. In the end, it should be noted that these recommendations follow the goal of improving the situation of the Rohingya minority in Myanmar with the highest aim to stop its genocide. In the longer run, this represents an essential step on a path towards a successful reintegration of the Rohingya minority to their homeland with legal recognition, ethnic equality and security guarantees.

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