Private Security and Public Trust in Post-apartheid South Africa

The country's economic, social, and political prosperity highly depends on trust in the government institutions. The more the society is divided the less it prospers, therefore high inequality can trap economies in the low growth. High corruption, crime, violence, regional disparities, and poor quality of government institutions, such as the police, lead citizens not to trust the government. Tilly shows that states are made according to processes that provide protection, equal divisions, and government institutions. The legitimacy of the state and the citizens' trust depends on how the state accomplishes it. He argues that the state is not a neutral actor. Tilly analyses how violence is a common practice in politics, in which violence in states is legitimized as a mechanism to obtain political changes (Tilly, 1986) . Therefore, this concept serves an important role in understanding citizens' low trust in the police in South Africa, where the use of violence and repression influenced trust in the state and its institutions. Moreover, Social capital depends on trust, and networks which arguably South Africa has a shortage of. Therefore, civilians are deprived of public goods, and as stated before the public lacks confidence in the police. They see the police as biased and unresponsive. The history of violence is embedded in the identities of South African peoples which resulted in a parochial, antagonistic political culture. The power of the institutions can be measured by civicness and arguably in South Africa, there is a phenomenon of the rise in organizations that practice institutional roles. Such as the provision of private security. Financially well-off citizens continue to choose private social services thus enlarging the difference between private security institutions and government security which creates more inequality of service delivery.

Historical route to South African democracy In the events that led up to apartheid, there was the migration of the Duch who settled in the Cape in 1652. As the Duch Cape colony grew, other groups of peoples followed on a large scale, such as French Huguenots, Dutch-held Java, German and British settlers, and Indian slaves brought by the British (Chibba, n.d.) . During the 19 th century, laws such as preventing voting or engaging in politics, owning land, perusing interracial relations, and restricting movements of blacks, coloureds, and Indians were passed down by British and Dutch colonists. (Chibba, n.d.) Mass mobilizations took place where whites occupied places from which millions of black citizens were forcefully removed. Throughout the regime, any resistance against it was met with armed repression from the government. (African Union, n.d.) The first democratic party was won by Mandela in 1994, and the government began to reform itself. The democratic transition of South Africa has a specific route that differs from Moore’s traditional three routes model of democracy. There is a deflection of the bourgeoise revolution, the conservative revolution, and the communist one (Moore, 1966) . The middle class is weak in South Africa due to segregation, and the democratic transformation of the society did not happen as Moore suggests. However, apartheid had stroked opposition among people in South Africa and the most important organisation was

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the African National Congress (ANC. Following the unsuccessful attempts of non-violent protests, which were met with military and police action resulting in fatalities and deaths, the ANC shifted its focus towards armed revolutionary efforts. Throughout the late 1970s and late 1980s anti-apartheid boycotts, sabotages, and clashes with police were happening on a daily basis. Furthermore, there was a growth of international pressure to change the apartheid regime. For example, South Africa was economically sanctioned, banned from the Olympics, and limited in trade and investment by many nations (Teach Democracy: formerly Constitutional Rights Foundation, n.d.) . The use of violence is one of the practices that resolve disputes to establish political change known, as the notion of a "self-help war system" (Rauch, 1991) . Corruption, inequality, high crime rates, and police brutality are ongoing in the post-apartheid society. “Current violence in South Africa is undoubtedly the legacy of colonialism and apartheid, but more particularly of a highly militarised state and civil society. Massive dislocation caused by decades of social engineering under apartheid and the rapid pace of early political reform have resulted in chronic social instability.” (Rauch, 1991) . The democratic route was not linear, full of struggle, compromises, and negotiations. The country has weak democratic norms and many South African citizens would give up elections if the non-ruling party ensured security, housing, and job availability (Mikhail Moosa and Jan Hofmeyr, 2021) .

The link between Private Security and public trust The private security sector has been expanding in South Africa in the post-apartheid era. It plays a significant role as a security provider. The public trust in the police in South Africa is declining due to the police's historical role as a repressive instrument of apartheid. The police are perceived as corrupt, and unable to respond effectively to current social conflicts and crime. According to Almond and Verba (1963), one of the most difficult tasks of democracy is the maintenance of a proper balance between governmental power and governmental responsiveness. It has a parallel between the demands made upon the citizens of the democratic system. The governmental responsiveness is seen in times of crises and the tension can be maintained by partisan conflict. Meaning the citizens have to be active and passive. They must be involved, but not too involved (Almond, Verba, 1963). Therefore, the citizens are not provided with responsive public security services. “Only one in four citizens say the police generally operate in a professional manner, and only one in 10 think the government is doing a good job of reducing crime.” (Mpako, A., Ndoma, S., 2024) .  This decline in trust is further exacerbated by political and social factors contributing to a general distrust of the institution.

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What causes trust?

(Almond, G. Verba, S., (1963).) Pippa Norris: Trust and confidence in agents and agencies pg. (128, 2017-2021) The European Values Survey shows that trust depends on many factors. The police and the armed forces score 5 th and 6 th as the most important factor on the trust. In South Africa, where the confidence in the armed forces and police is not so high, the financially well-off public can hire South Africa’s private security. Not only is the private security industry more efficient and reliable, but there are more than 2.7 million registered officers in comparison to less than 150,000 police officers for a population of 62 million people. (Africanews, 2024)

The culture of violence South Africa has a long history of violence. Violence was used as an aspect to control and establish power over Indigenous people by colonialists stretching from 1652. The invasion was executed not only by Europeans but also by the groups from the north. Similarly, the apartheid regime used violence and other means to separate and control South Africans to establish political power in 1948. Each generation experienced violence and therefore arguably, cultural violence results in an era of untrustful society towards state institutions, like the police. Tilly's (1986) analysis compares state making, and war making to organized crime. States have the power to execute legitimised crimes on their territory to dispose of internal rivals. Moreover, States are keen on waging wars to increase mercantile capitalism, eliminate rivals outside of their territory, and gain more resources. He claims that mercantile capitalism and state making go hand in hand while those in power need access to capital. (Tilly, 1986) . There is little to no trust in the police. “In 1992, forty-four people were murdered every day in South Africa. In the years since State President F W De Klerk made his dramatic reform announcement, more than eight South Africans have died daily as a result of political violence. The lack of effective police action to contain, prevent, or investigate violence has exacerbated the already dire state of police-community relations.” (Rauch,

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1991. . The violence and segregation have been institutionalised and legitimised resulting in the vicious circle of violence. Furthermore, the South African case of the militarisation of the police at Marikana highlighted issues within the police force in 2012. It damaged the public trust in the South African Police Service (SAPS) and challenged the trustworthiness of the legitimacy of the government. “Events at Marikana have to be seen in the context of South Africa’s failure to tackle the structural violence of apartheid and the use of direct, personal violence by the police before and since the country became a constitutional democracy in 1994.” (Dixon,
1992. . Arguably, this is the legacy of South Africa. Figure 1

Afrobarometer (R9 2021/2023) South Africa This data from 2021 to 2023, shows how often the police, according to people, use excessive force during protests citizens experienced use of force during protests. Figure 2

Afrobarometer (R9 2021/2023) South Africa

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Moreover, as it was argued, the use of violence under apartheid was seen as politically motivated which partly explains the low trust in the police. This data show that 43,4% of people do not trust the police.

Conclusion South Africa had its own dynamic historical route of violence. Linked to Tilly's analysis of state making as organised crime, South Africa is arguably not a result of a social contract but rather it historically underwent through coercion, violence, and economic interests to create and maintain power by Dutch, and British. There is declining trust in institutions which might suggest that citizens are losing attachment to the democratic system and its symbols. Trust in the president, police, parliament, and courts is low. This undermines the legitimacy of the democracy and can lead to instability. Moreover, the growing willingness to give up elections in exchange for an unelected government to ensure public goods is a signal that systemic affection is waning. The apartheid ensured persistent inequality and injustice. This contributed even to low social trust. If people do not trust each other, it is difficult to build trust in political institutions. Based on Almond and Verba's concepts, South Africa experiences an imbalance between participation and passivity where low trust in institutions results in citizens feeling alienated from the political process and unsure of their ability to influence it. This increases frustration and reduction of participation in political life. Citizens perceive the system as unable to solve their problems which fuels their mistrust in government institutions such as the police and turn to private security which deepens the inequality among the people.

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Bibliografia African Union. (n.d.). Retrieved from AUHRM Project Focus Area: The Apartheid: https://au.int/en/auhrm-project-focus-area- apartheid#::text=The%20Apartheid%20(1948%20to%201994,contact%20between%20the% 20two%20groups Africanews, R. (2024, August 13). africannews. Retrieved from South Africa: private security industry booming: news.com/2024/01/05/south-africa-private-security-industry-booming// Almond, G. Verba, S. ((1963).). The civic culture: Political attitudes and democracy un five. Princeton: NJ: Princeton University Press. Chibba, S. (n.d.). South Africa. Retrieved from A history of South African democracy: https://www.southafrica.net/za/en/travel/article/a-history-of-south-african-democracy Dixon, B. (2015, 6 12). A Violent Legacy: Policing Insurrection in South Africa From Sharpeville to Marikana. The British Journal of Criminology,Volume 55, Issue 6, Pages 1131–1148. Mikhail Moosa and Jan Hofmeyr. (2021, 8 24). South Africans’ trust in institutions and. Retrieved from Afrobarometer : ad474-south_africans_trust_in_institutions_reaches_new_low- afrobarometer-20aug21.pdf Moore, B. (1966). Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Boston, MA: Beacin Press. Mpako, A., Ndoma, S. (2024, 9 Monday). AD836: South Africans’ view of police marred by pervasive corruption, lack of professionalism. Retrieved from Afro Barometer: https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/ad836-south-africans-view-of-police-marred- by-pervasive-corruption-lack-of- professionalism/#::text=Only%20about%20one%2Dthird%20(32,since%202011%2C%20to% 2043%25. Rauch, J. (1991). The Police and the Violence in South Africa. San Francisco: the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology,. Teach Democracy: formerly Constitutional Rights Foundation. (n.d.). Retrieved from BRIA 12 2 a South Africa: Revolution at the Ballot Box: https://teachdemocracy.org/bill-of-rights-in- action/bria-12-2-a-south-africa-revolution-at-the-ballot-box Tilly, C. (1986). War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. Cambridge: Cambridge Univerity Press. South African Police (1990) Yearbook 1991, Pretoria. South African Police (1992) Yearbook 1993, Pretoria