Can Rwanda Become a Liberal Democracy?
Few African countries have experienced as sharp economic growth as Rwanda has in the past two decades (Adesina, 2022). President Paul Kagame has openly declared his ambition to transform it into the so-called "new Singapore" and talks about rapid digitalization (Musoni, 2022). Rwanda is becoming one of the leaders in the region despite an economic slowdown in recent years. Several commentators have described its transformation as “remarkable”, with Zakaria (2009) calling it “Africa’s biggest success story”. The reason why it is so magnificent is that less than three decades ago the Rwandan genocide occurred during which as many as 500,000 deaths were recorded (Guichaoua, 2019). As Kuperman (2000) points out, the most remarkable aspect was its speed: more than 250,000 were killed just in two weeks. However, academics point out that the origins of the genocide were centuries old (Newbury, 1998). One of the main goals of my paper will be to critically evaluate the social development and the relationships between ethnic minorities in Rwanda. Hereby, we identify three crucial breaking points which need to be further examined because they have had a strong influence up until today: colonization, independence, and genocide. Rwanda has made significant improvements in its educational and health systems, but it remains a very restrictive country with a very strong authoritarian leader and little room for dissent. Our main research question is if the economic growth can be transferred into a more liberal Rwandan regime in terms of political and civic freedoms as well.
In our research, we will perform a case study. We will focus in great detail on one unit, namely Rwanda. In case studies, researchers can draw general conclusions for all cases that contain similar variables (Gerring, 2004) In the case of Rwanda, we can apply the concept of developmental authoritarianism. The current President Kagame has been praised for promoting economic and civil development, combating corruption, and implementing e-government. Nevertheless, he strongly suppressed the opposition, restricted press freedom, and set up the conditions to remain in power for life. In summary, economic progress came at the cost of political and civic liberties. With the current conditions in place, and with a highly centralized state with little to no room for participation, the establishment of liberal democracy would be immensely challenging.
Historical Analysis
Neither European nor contemporary perspectives should be used when analyzing the history of Rwanda. To understand it, we need to go back to pre-modern times before states were created along their current borders. The first kingdoms were created in what is contemporary Rwanda when the clans began to merge in the 15th century (Chrétien, 2006). Founded by cattle-rearing Tutsi people fleeing famine and drought, they discovered the Hutu people had lived there for centuries before they arrived. History scholars have radically differing interpretations as to whether Tutsi and Hutu felt like two different tribes or whether they were convinced they belonged to one nation (Uvin, 1998). Traditionally, Tutsi historians claimed that both communities spoke the same language and worshipped the same God, thereby belonging to the same ethnic group (Newbury, 1998). According to the Tutsi tradition, they only differed due to socioeconomic factors. Hutus, on the other hand, believe that "foreign" Tutsi cattle rearers oppressed and exploited them. The question which needs to be answered is whether this dominant narrative among Hutu nationalists was invented or reliant on earlier authentic beliefs. According to some historians, Hutu were inferior to Tutsi from the beginning and had no choice but to serve their chiefs (Mamdani, 2002). The fact remains that by the end of the nineteenth century, Rwanda had been a centralized and hierarchical kingdom with important class distinctions with the power concentrated in the hands of Tutsi (Uvin, 1998). According to Moore (1966), "a rough balance between the crown and nobility" is a prerequisite for democracy (p.415). This was not the case in Rwanda, where the Tutsi king was treated as a semi-divine figure (Newbury, 1998).
The crucial factor in class relations in Rwanda is colonialism. Following The Berlin Conference of 1884, Germany colonized Rwanda in 1897 as a part of German East Africa, and Belgian forces took over after the First World War. German and Belgian colonizers considered Hutu and Tutsi to be different races and promoted Tutsi superiority; they even created identity cards to prevent any movement between classes (Gourevitch, 2000). As Newbury (1998) points out, European rulers were intent on preserving what they were as "traditional" structures of power, in which Tutsi ruled over Hutu peasants. Thus, colonization amplified the differences between both groups that existed before. Uvin (1998) states that colonization resulted in the rise of local Tutsi leaders who created burdensome obligations for ordinary people including taxes and obligatory labor. According to Tilly (1985), violence created by states was responsible for modernization. Rwanda, whose colonization enabled a greater degree of centralization and bureaucracy, may be an example. The problem, however, was the rising inequality. Whereas Tutsi had access to post-primary education and took administrative positions, Hutu had dramatically fewer opportunities to do so. This dominance was not a product of the internal balancing of powers but rather propped from the outside.
Decolonization, which followed heavy pressure from the Tutsi establishment and the United Nations in 1959, is even more crucial to understanding contemporary Rwanda. The key element in subsequent years was the corporate view of ethnicity that blamed all Tutsis for decades of colonialism (Newbury, 1998). The religious authorities and even a part of the Tutsi elite began favoring Hutus after independence because they were considered less radical than Tutis (Uvin, 1998). That was one of the reasons Hutus gained almost all the power in the years to come (Destexhe, 1995). Between 1961 and 1961, 40 to 70 percent of the Tutsi population in Rwanda fled following the Hutu massacres. There was a pro-Hutu government in power in the following decades, but there was also increasing economic prosperity and an easing of tensions between groups. In 1990, however, descendants of the Tutsi people who had fled in the 1960s united in the Rwandan Patriotic Front and invaded Rwanda, reacting to massive killings of thousands of Tutsi who were pushed out into the jungle. The pretext for the 1994 Rwandan genocide was the shutting down of the plane of President Juvénal Habyarimana, an ethnic Hutu. In response to the accident, Hutu politicians and media encouraged their fellow citizens to take revenge and break into neighboring Tutsi homes.
As Kuperman (2000) writes, the most remarkable aspect of the genocide was its speed: as many as 250,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed in just over two weeks. The total death toll was estimated at 500,000 to one million (Binagwaho, 2014). However, it would be a mistake to conclude that the Rwandan government had been weak before the genocide; rather, it had been viewed as a well-developing country with good national growth (Kuperman, 2000). As Uvin (1998) points out, genocide started for several reasons, including an uninformed and uneducated peasant mass treated oppressively, a history of human right violation, and growing inequality. A major point to be considered, according to Newbury (1998), is the disaffection of the rural Hutu who, several decades into decolonization, kept feeling outright anger toward Tutsi authorities. Uvin (1998) adds that we should not overlook structural problems, such as the development process that created a fertile environment for elites to mobilize aggressive sentiments against minorities.
Following the genocide, the Tutsi minority took control and continued the process of institutionalization, which resulted in significant progress for the country (Newbury, 1998). It could be argued that further reforms would not be possible without the response following the genocide. But despite its remarkable improvements in health care and growth, the historical preconditions are still not favorable for democracy in Rwanda. No democracy exists without the bourgeoisie, as Moore (1966) points out. However, the middle class has been historically very weak and continues to be ineffective in Rwanda. It is important to note that Rwanda was simply unable to have a strong class of town dwellers because its urbanization rate has been historically very low. Even today, it remains a mostly agrarian country in which as little as 17,5% percent of the population lives in urban areas and cities (O'Neill, 2022). 3. Political Culture
In the post-World War II era, political science gave a great deal of attention to democracy around the globe. However, scholars were long unable to explain why some countries were well-functioning liberal democracies while others were not. Some predicted that the new emerging countries in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America would follow the path of the wealthy West with economic reforms and a free market, but that did not happen. Furthermore, there was vibrant discussion about why the Arab Spring pro-democracy protests, which many found to be extremely promising, ended disastrously in most Middle Eastern countries (Robbins, 2015). In this context, scholars have noted that in several countries, demonstrations for democracy hardly ever took place (Mills, 2012).
Easton (1975) introduced the idea that demands and support influence a political system that produces policies. With their revolutionary concept of political culture, Almond and Verba (1963) expanded on it. They define political culture as a "distribution of attitudes towards political objects in a given society" (p. 2). The authors seek to find out what attitudes the society holds towards demand and support, policies, and political systems as such. According to this formula, they distinguish between three main types of political culture: parochial, subject, and participant. Although no society fits into any of these categories, this concept can help us understand the motivations and approaches of populations around the world including Rwanda.
To start, there are very few connections between Rwanda and participatory culture. Participant societies have a positive attitude towards demand, support, and political systems, but the Rwandan population has been largely inactive. As we mentioned in the previous chapter, Rwanda had been a centralized and hierarchical kingdom with significant class distinctions. Colonization further deepened this division and obliterated all opposition and potential dissent. According to Almond and Verba (1963), it was common for African tribal societies to follow the parochial culture. Parochial culture in political systems is “likely to be affective and normative rather than cognitive” (p. 9). Essentially, people do not have a deep understanding of current events but focus instead on their feelings and emotions. In Rwanda, a large proportion of the population may not have access to information simply due to practical reasons. Even compared with other African countries, the number of mobile telephone subscribers and internet users is very low (Social Progress Imperative, 2022). Subject culture has a positive orientation toward outputs but zero orientation towards the remaining three criteria. Given the centralized role of President Kagame, contemporary Rwanda incorporates many elements of the subject culture. Although further investigation is necessary, Rwanda seems to fit into a parochial-subject culture.
The Rwandan society is full of paradoxes. A huge problem when analyzing data is a lack of reliable data, which is vital to note before proceeding. In neither the World Value Survey nor Afrobarometer do we find data about Rwanda’s support for individual policies, the current leader, or the system in general. As a result, we must rely on limited research, and we must also take into account the authoritative nature of President Kagame when assessing the present data. Nonetheless, according to the surveys we do have, satisfaction with the current state is interestingly high. Rwanda, for instance, ranks 26th in the world when it comes to satisfaction with the availability of quality healthcare; by far the highest in the region (Social Progress Index, 2022). Moreover, only 7 percent of Rwandans believe the government is corrupt, a lower percentage than in any other African country (Loschky, 2016). Additionally, more than 95 percent of the Rwandan population believes that its children are treated with dignity and respect, suggesting a high level of horizontal trust (Reinhart, 2019).
Source: Social Progress Index
Over the last few decades, Kagame has consistently won the elections with more than 95 percent of the votes. However, Stressing that he enjoys such great popularity in the country would be a big oversimplification. Even though Kagame was praised for maintaining stability and economic growth, he has also crushed political dissent (Freedom House, 2022). His political opponents faced surveillance, intimidation, or even torture. As far as political rights and civil liberties are concerned, Rwanda scores very low: the government can prevent political parties from being registered, the legislature and judiciary are not independent, and the media are subject to formal and informal controls (Freedom House, 2022). Both the freedom of discussion and the right to peaceful assembly are practically nonexistent. It implies that for now, the democratization of Rwanda would pose a significant challenge.
- Democracy and Rwanda
As I have mentioned previously; whether a country becomes democratic or not, and what the reasons are, has long fascinated social scientists and political scientists. Inglehart and Welzel (2005) describe modernization theory in a revolutionary text. According to them, socioeconomic development produces roughly predictable cultural changes, including secular and tolerant people who place more emphasis on self-expression, participation, and quality of life. As a result, democratization is more likely to take place as individuals are given more importance. In Rwanda, over the decade to 2019, its economy grew by more than 7 percent on average (Adesina, 2022). However, Inglehart and Welzel make sure to mention that social processes are not deterministic. Democratization is not seen as a straightforward process but rather a long route that can take years; in some cases even decades. Hence, the formula that economic growth leads to democratization automatically does not hold. In fact, historical cultural heritage and other cultural factors are important as well which is crucial in the context of Rwanda.
It might be argued that Rwanda, despite not being a liberal democracy yet, will catch up when it becomes more prosperous. Nonetheless, the research shows that economic growth plays an important role in democratization but cannot be the only factor. Amartya Sen (2001) mentions that political and civil rights are not only the primary goals of development but also their principal means. However, Rwanda has a very poor record when it comes to freedoms: President Kagame has been in power for more than two decades and has systematically suppressed opposition.
When it comes to Rwanda, several scholars have used the concept of developmental authoritarianism. To put it simply, it is a system in which the government has a high degree of control over society to promote economic growth (Kok Wah, 2002). In such a society, the government is crucial to plan the economy: in the case of Rwanda by implementing economic reforms to promote the development of technologies or infrastructure projects. However, byproducts are often policies restricting the freedom of individuals - such as critical journalists - in order to achieve economic reforms more easily and without scrutiny. Ngcayisa (2021) defines five key characteristics of developmental authoritarianism. The first one is that the ascension to power after dissolution unifies citizens. President Kagame started the Rwandan reconciliation process and united the country shaped by a bloody genocide; at least on paper (Ssuuna, 2019). Secondly, developmental authoritarianism imposes restrictions on speech and association, justifying restrictions by the possibility of further conflict or dissolution. Thirdly, Ngcayisa mentions the importance of promoting economic development and the importance of trade with more emphasis on exports than imports. Furthermore, he claims that developmental authoritarian leaders remind their domestic audience of the possible instability which they use as an explanation for why they stay in power. Finally, the system is characterized by pragmatic relationships with the West which are mutually beneficial for both sides. When it comes to Rwanda, Kagame has had a positive relationship with the United States for decades. Claiming the importance of security and stability, the US has provided Rwanda with military and economic reforms and Kagame has visited Washington on several occasions (Arieff, 2019).
Meanwhile, President Kagame has done a great job of presenting his ideas overseas. Many in the West have heard about its "economic miracle" accompanied by growth and poverty reduction in spite of the lack of data. The question remains, however, how much Kagame contributed to it and how much of it was due to foreign aid. For a long time, the Rwandan budget was dependent on development assistance for more than 50% (Horne, Kagabo, 2012). Even so, Kagame touts growth as his accomplishment and keeps talking about making Rwanda the "digital hub" of Africa. In December 2020, Kagame presented the so-called Vision 2050, a plan aimed at turning Rwanda into a high-income country. Again, he uses the commitment to improve the quality of life of Rwandans to justify his continued leadership.
- Conclusion
As part of this case study, I have attempted to understand whether Rwanda can become a liberal democracy. Foreign aid has contributed greatly to its remarkable economic success since 1994. However, in spite of its improved living conditions and health system, civil rights and political rights are virtually nonexistent. The research shows that freedom is not only an end in itself but also a means towards democratization: it might be naive to expect that freedom will catch up when it becomes economically strong. By consolidating power, Kagame leaves no space for opposition, either through scrutiny or dissent. In the current state of affairs, Rwanda does not seem to be a suitable candidate for liberal democracy. Moreover, the historical roots are not wishful, either. It was historically a strongly authoritarian and hierarchical country with no balance between emperor and nobility. In the wake of colonization, ethnic differences widened, provoking further violence and disrupting the existing system. The Rwandan modernization period begab during a time of great wealth and power inequalities, a strong indicator that Rwanda would not develop into a democracy, too.
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