Alternative fur den Osten

One of the greatest German novelist, Thomas Mann, 1929’s Laureate of Nobel Prize for Literature wrote in his masterpiece The Magic Mountain: “A harmful truth is better than a useful lie” (Mann, 1924). This short quote is excellent for the start of the case study of Germany. Indeed, many countries may use this quote for an explanation of the political situation, but in case Germany helps us to analyze the progress of one country from pre-modernized absolute monarchy, trough weak democracy, fascism accompanied by the tragedy of the Hholocaust and to one of the leading country in the world, highly developed liberal democracy. This case study observes on one side the story of Germany, but on the other observes the story of Eastern and Western parts of Germany during the periods of Prussia, Hitler, Cold-War until the story after unification. The first part is based on a historical analysis of the modernization process, while the second finds the differences between East and West from the perspective of the development of civic culture and the process of unification. The latest, third part observes Germany today and explains the story behind the success of AfD in Eastern regions, supported by the observation of West German’s post-modern transition. After all, this paper studies Germany from the 18th century until the present daynowadays, based on through the processes of democratization, modernization, post-modernization. The story of German is a story of success, but it is a shame that it took more than 70 years to understand Mann’s message about “a harmful truth is better”.

**Pre-modern and Modern Germany, Historical Institutionalism ** **2.1. Introduction to Historical Analysis **

Nowadays, Germans sing in their national anthem: “Unity and justice and freedom are the safeguard of fortune” (Deutscher Bundestag, n.d.), but the love for freedom was not always in their hearts. They experienced small divided states, oppressive monarchy, weak democracy with the economical crisis, fascism as the outcome of the revolution from above, and then socialism or democracy during occupied times.

According to the last Democracy Index (Economist, 2019), Germany is the 13th most democratic country in the world (out of 167 countries), with a score of 8.68 out of 10. Nevertheless, there is always something to improve. All European countries are experiencing a wave of populism, extremism, and mistrust toward political institutions. Also this study would try to analyzes the trust toward political institutions and the progress of the quality of the civic culture from 1990 in Germany.

An important part of this case study is a deep look into historical institutionalism. As Moore (1966) and Tilly (1985) state, the architecture of the modern state is based on the processes of modernization. But the modernization is not only historical issue, irrelevant for the present times. Process and quality of modernization are important factors in today’s politics and are crucial for the understanding of modern formation of the state.

All the things considered, this part of the case study presents the pre-modernized society, the process of modernization as the main aspects for the understanding issues of the political trust and the condition of the civic culture, in Germany after 1990.

2.2. Crucial period of the economical and political modernization, Prussia

Otto von Bismarck stated in his famous speech to the Prussian Parliament, ”Germany does not look to Prussia's liberalism, but to her power …. The great questions of the day are not to be decided by speeches and majority resolutions – but by blood and iron!” (Schüßler, 1928). The blood and iron are reflecting Tilly’s (1985) main argument that a state has been created when external and internal enemies were eliminated or governed thanks to the system of state apparatus and bureaucracy. Bismarck’s era may be understood as a crucial point in the state-making of Prussia, later Germany. His final process of unification and earlier process of industrialization and economic reforms, wars against France, and friendship with Austria helped to create a modern German state, based on Tilly’s model of state-architecture.

American sociologist Charles Tilly (1985, p. 169-186) argued that states in the modern sense are made thanks to organized violence. Firstly, the state organizes violence against external enemies (war-making) and internal enemies (state-making). Secondly, the state gains resources (extraction) for violence and running of the bureaucracy. Thirdly, protect clients of the state (protection). Altogether, these four points: state-making, war-making, protection, and extraction are the essential architecture of each modern state. The state guarantees its citizens externally (against other states) and internally (against domestic transgressors) protection in exchange for their investments into the state through taxes. Of course, the state needs apparatus, mainly: bureaucracy, courts, army, and police to control these processes. In the case of Germany (Prussia), these processes may be observed during the 19th century, specifically during the eras of Stein, Hardenberg, and Bismarck.

The first significant change happened in 1807 when Frederick William III of Prussia was dealing with Napoleon. After defeats in Jena and Auerstedt (1806), F. William asked Freiherr von Stein and Karl August von Hardenberg to start a careful reformation (Blackbourn, 2002, p. 60-64). “The reforms were revolutionary: the abolishment of serfdom, the repeal of laws preventing class-mobility, the right to own and acquire property, trade and enterprise restrictions, …” (Enderink, 2010, p. 31). These reforms and processes between 1807 and 1815 illustrate the processes of extraction and protection, outcomes of the Napoleonic wars (war-making and state-making).

Equally important to reforms was the process of industrialization that was late in comparison with the other states in Western Europe. The economy in Prussia was not working perfectly as a reason for the not realized/ late industrialization. Tilly's brother, Richard Tilly (1966) in his academic study presents the argument that the crucial economical and institutional changes in Prussia happened between 1815-1866. After Napoleonic Wars in 1815 “Prussia was an industrial backwater … by the mid-1860’s Prussia had achieved a considerable degree of industrialization.” (p. 484). Tilly (1966, pp. 484-489) argues that the most important point was an investment into railroads. These successful industrial reforms and tax policies prepared the country for the final creation of the modern German state, from an economic perspective.

Finally, coming to Bismarck’s era that may be considered as a breaking point of Tilly’s development of the modern state. Bismarck’s (Blackbourn, 2002, pp. 175-177) administration created a solid international position, unified Germany, and increased the efficiency of the state bureaucracy (Blackbourn, 2002, pp. 175-177). Wilhelm I and O. von Bismarck created a balance between all institutions and gained public support. As Enderink observed, this period is also connected with the acquisition of rights, tax reforms, “the emergence of a modern army” (Enderink, 2010, p. 39). Notably, modern German bureaucracy and political institutions were essential outcomes of the German unification (1871).

Additionally, the creation of modern united Germany does not necessarily create conditions for further fascism. Political institutions and state apparatus were created similarly as in other Western European democratic countries. HoweverFrom my point of view, the crucial difference between them was the timing of the industrialization and social classes and their relations, observed by Moore (1966). In other words, the created state was working-well during fascism but was not created exclusively to be a fascist. To summarize, Tilly’s processes in Germany were only created conditions for the further regime development and were not its primary causes.

To conclude, Tilly’s argument about the process of modernization and how state organize violence may be seen in Prussia (Germany) during the whole 19th century. The impulse for war-making was Napoleonic wars and then later wars with France, state-making is represented by Bismarck’s unification of Germany. Protection, together with extraction was needed for a successful war and state-making. In particular, without tax-reforms and the raise of the rights and security, successful unification would hardly be realizable. Finally, the successful application of Charles Tilly’s theory in German’s case may be seen in the person of Otto on Bismarck and his unification of Germany. And as mentioned above, unification, in general, was only a condition for further fascism, not its principal cause.

**2.3. The rise and origin of a fascism
** One of the leading studies of comparative politics and political sociology is complex work written in 1966 by American sociologist Barrington Moore Jr. called Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern Wworld (1966). Moore used a comparative method to explore origins of the democracy, fascism, and communism based on the structural understanding of the social and historical changes. He argued that there were three different ways of modernization, and each of them leads toward a different regime. This theory is different from others because he argued that democracy is not the only possible solution to modernization. Communism and fascism are also possible outcomes of the transition during modernity. Germany is also included in Moore’s work and considered as an example of the middle way between democracy and communism, fascism.

Only one of three ways of modernization leads toward democracy and depends on the bourgeoisie. There are not many works that may be simplified into four words, but Moore’s work is an exception. “No bourgeois, no democracy” (Moore, 1966) is the instant formula for the democratic variant of modernization. Democratic modernization may be successful after the commercialization of agriculture and “the emergence of a vigorous urban bourgeoisie” (Pavone, 2015, p. 2). The strong bourgeoisie is needed for democracy.

Countries without a strong bourgeoisie went on two other possible ways of modernization. First, when the bourgeoisie is not strong enough and endangered by the peasantry, then the only possible solution for the coalition of bourgeoise and aristocracy is to ask the state for economic protection. This modernization results in an authoritative and strong regime, later in fascist “revolution from above” (Moore, 1966, p. 436). Second, when bourgeoise is not present and peasants revolt and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, later communism. According to Moore, all states have modernized either in a democratic, fascist, or communist way based on the structures and relations in society. Mainly, relations between monarch, aristocracy, bourgeoise, and peasants.

Not only the weak bourgeoisie but also other factors helped Germany on its way toward fascism. Stephens (1989) and other scholars state that the significant point is in the timing of the industrialization and alliances created during industrialization. Specifically in Germany, the late industrialization “was dependent on the state which tied the German bourgeoisie to the state and strengthened the authoritarian Junker-crown alliance” (Stephens, 1989, p. 1025). Also, according to Stephens (1989), failure in the world war, industrial centralization, lack of colonies, and none allies of the working class should be considered as other factors leading toward fascism in Germany. Equally important is Moore’s (1966) observation that Germany established a “labor-repressive agrarian system that provides an unfavorable soil for the growth of democracy and important part leading to fascism” (p. 435). The German system was not giving a degree of freedom from the monarchy that was essential on the way to the parliamentary democracy.

After all, different scholars understand and approach this topic differently. Moore’s theory divides the world into three types of countries, countries with bourgeoisie and democracy, countries with weak bourgeoise and fascism, and countries without bourgeoisie with communism. Germany is a leading example of one of these possible ways. A combination of the weak bourgeoisie, labor-repressive agrarian system, failure in the world war, and late industrialization created a decent base for the future fascism.

**2.4. The Conclusion of the Historical Analysis **

Is the unification of Germany a creation of a modern German state? Many scholars answer the question of the transition to the modern state from their perspective. For illustration, in Tilly’s work (1985) is a modern state formed when “monarchs controlled monopoly of large-scale violence” (p. 174). Moore (1966) looks at the modernization process from the perspective of society. In short, division of social classes and interactions between them are the main predispositions for democracy, communism or fascism. So, the process of modernization for Tilly is supposed to be finished during Bismarck’s era (1871), while for Moore during the creation of the Third Reich (1933). Stephens (1989) argues that the transition to modernity happened between 1870 – 1939, so for him is the transition represented by the Second German Empire (Bismarck’s era), Weimar Republic, and also the Third Reich.

The first turning point to the modern state was the Bismarck’s era and the creation of the Second German Empire (1871). As Dalton (2013) states, the Second German Empire may be characterized as a “government that expected a little of its citizens: pay their taxes, serve in the army, and keep the mouth shut” (p. 255). This highly centralized monarchy helped to industrialize Germany on one hand, but on the other brought Germany to the First World War. After WWI was created a democratic republic, the so-called Weimar Republic. But as Moore (1966) noted, this society was not prepared for a democratic route, so after a few years ended with the revolution from above, fascism. Dalton (2013) argues that a society burdened by the economical collapse in the 1920s and the Versailles Treaty was influenced by Hitler’s easy solutions. “The institution weaknesses of the political system … and drastic underestimation of Hitler’s ambitions, intentions, and political abilities” (Dalton, 2013, p. 256) created a detonator for the cruel dictatorship and the Second World War. After the Second World War was Germany formed in two different routes, in a democratic way on the west and in a communist way on the east. Important to notice is that these ways were not of German origin, but implemented by the winning powers of the Second World War, the USA, and the USSR.

To conclude, the German transition into modern society was fruitful in showing the theoretical examples. German story showed us an example of the fascist revolution from above (Moore, 1966) and the impact of industrialization on the war-making and state-making process (Tilly, 1985). And in the end, the negative experience with the different regimes as a support on a way toward democracy. So when looking at modern democratic Germany, it is important to realize that this country’s modernization was held during Prussia, Wilhelm’s Germany (Bismarck’s era), Weimar’s republic, and also during Hitler’s Third Reich. All these episodes of the German episodes are equally relevant in making a detailed snapshot of the historical institutionalism for the further comparative analysis of the civic culture.

3. Modern and unified Germany, Political Culture

3.1. Introduction to Civic Culture’s analysis

Thirty years ago (1990), promised the German President promised to overcome differences between west and east in his famous speech during the declaration of German unification: “We must first of all come to understand each other better. We will only be on the right track when we truly realize that both sides have amassed valuable experiences and important qualities worth preserving in unity. On this day, we are founding a common state. No government treaty, constitution, or legislative decision can determine how well unity will succeed on a human level. It depends on the behavior of each one of us, on our own openness to one another. I am certain that we will succeed in overcoming old and new divisions. We can combine the constitutional patriotism that evolved on one side with the human solidarity that was lived on the other to form a powerful whole. We have the common resolve to fulfill the great tasks our neighbors expect of us. We know how much more difficult the situation is for other peoples on this earth right now. The more convincingly we, in a united Germany, manage to live up to our responsibility for peace in Europe and the world, the better it will be for our future at home. History is giving us the chance. We will take advantage of it with confidence and trust.” (German History in Documents and Images, n.d.).

Speech and signature on a unification treaty were easy for one man, but the start of a huge process for the whole of Germany. Nowadays, Germany is considered to be one of the most stable and developed democracies and economies in the world. But steps toward that stage were difficult and required a sufficient level of energy, tolerance, and hope. But the story of modern unified German may be considered as a successful one. The second part of this case study explains German political culture, development of civic culture, and transition of Eastern totalitarian socialist society to liberal democratic. Specifically, education, economic experience, and political socialization as major factors that influence German development and also created differences between East and West.

The main aim of this paper is to identify differences between East and West, explain the causes of these differences, and interpret higher mistrust in Eastern regions. To conclude, thanks to education, good experience with economical benefits, and political socialization Germany is considered to be a stable democracy with fully-developed civic culture, which is a major shift from the times of Almond and Verba’s research in 1963.

3.2. Story after the unification

The thesis about two different Germanies, Wwestern stable democracy and Eeastern weak democracy with the legacy of communism was relevant in the 90s and needs a fresh update based on the latest empirical data. On the 12th September of 1990, four foreign powers (Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, United States of America) had signed a treaty about allowance to reunify Germany. The so-called “Zwei-plus-Vier-Vertrag” or Two plus Four agreement was a legal unification of the German Democratic Republic (further only: EG) and Federal Republic of Germany (further only: WG), with effectiveness from 15th March 1991. Since 1991 there is one united Germany, called “Bundesrepublik Deutschland” (Federal Republic of Germany) but the process of unification/ blend of two different political cultures is not instant as constitutional unification and needs long-term effort and changes.

“Life satisfaction in East Germany has skyrocketed since 1991 and now is closing in on opinions in the West. In 1991, 15 percent of those living in former East Germany said their life was a 7, 8, 9, or 10 on a 0-10 scale, but in 2019 that ballooned to 59 percent. Meanwhile, life satisfaction in the West has also increased since 1991, from 52 percent to 64 percent today” (Pew Research Center, 2019, p. 19). The most recent comparative study on satisfaction with democracy in post-communist European countries published by Pew Research Center (2019) indicates small differences in affective orientations toward the regime in EG and WG, specifically: support of the democratic regime, trust toward constitution, and belief about the system as the best possible (lack of tendency to overthrow democratic regime).

The main differences are the results of the dissatisfaction with government, while in WG are seen in constructive critique, in EG in favoring the unsystematic and populist parties. Indeed, negative attitudes are always present in politics, but WG connects these negative attitudes with parties and leaders, not with the regime, and finding another regime as an opportunity to solve their problems. This fact creates a very dangerous formula for eastern parts which may result in a vote of unsystematic parties and political extremism. As can been seen in the last federal elections, the popularity of AfD (Alternative für Deutschland, right-wing populist party focused on anti-migrant, anti-EU and anti-LGBT issues). While the support of AfD in WG was 10.23 percent, the average support of AfD in EG reach more than 20 percent (The Federal Returning Office, 2017) in EG.

The main differences between WG and EG are period of experience with democracy and capitalism, education toward civic participation, and legacy of the previous regime. As David Easton claims “trust may result from experience over time … typically this is what is hoped for in newly formed systems” (Easton, 1975, p. 435-457). The second part of this case study would describe the German experience after 1991 (German unification) as the explanation of the differences in trust toward regimes and institutions in western and eastern parts, resulting in significant changes in the popularity of far-right populist parties.

3.3. German Political Culture, historic route toward civic culture

Nuclear fission is an essential process of the nuclear reactor, thanks to which 83.1 percent of households receive electricity around Slovakia (Slovenské elektrárne, 2020). But in nature (universe) exist also opposite reaction called fusion, a process which “creates huge amounts of energy, several times greater than fission” (Office of Nuclear Energy, 2018). Process of the nuclear fusion may be seen in the atmosphere of the sun but is hardly achievable in conditions on earth. After all, nuclear fusion has something common with “fusion” (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 337-374) of different political cultures, so-called mixed culture that may be seen in stable democratic countries (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 337-374). Both of them are unstable and need constant maintenance. These days, Germany’s political culture presents a mix of political cultures (civic culture), established thanks to the changes in the education process and decades of positive experience with democracy after several brutal regimes in past.

The starting point for the understanding of the civic culture is the observations of three idealist political cultures (parochial, subject, participant). Almond & Verba (1963) observe three idealists' political cultures: parochial, subject, and participant. Briefly, citizens in the parochial, subject and participant political culture have different knowledge of the system in general, structures and actors of the system, acts and results from the system, and obligations (their role) toward the system. When there are almost zero levels of this knowledge in all previously mentioned aspects, then the political culture is called parochial. In other words, parochial culture is a culture where political knowledge and participation absent. Under the subject of political culture, Almond & Verba (1963) understand the stage when citizens are only passive viewers of the regime, generally understand it, and know the outputs. This political culture (subject) may be seen in Bismarck’s Germany when citizens know obligation to “pay taxes, serve in the army, and keep the mount shut” (Dalton, 2013, p. 255). The difference between citizens of Bismarck’s Germany and citizens of stable democratic countries (participant political culture) is their “knowledge, feelings and opinion about structures, leaders and policy proposals” and their “rights, powers, obligations” (Almond & Verba, 1963, pp. 1-44) toward the political system. In the last political culture (participant political culture) citizens “tend to be explicitly oriented … to both input and output accepts of the political system” (Almond & Verba, 1963, pp. 1-44). In other words, in participant political culture, a citizen is realizing that he/ she is not only a viewer of the system, but an actor with rights and obligations to influence (participant).

In reality, none of these three idealist political cultures (parochial, subject, participant) appear solitarily in society, their mix is very common. The mix which Almond and Verba found as the most stable is called civic culture. “Civic culture is a particular mix of citizens, subjects, and parochial” (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 1-44) is a formula that corresponds with stable and well-governing democracy, found in UK or USA during their times. According to their study, citizens of stable democracies do not replace their parochial and subject orientations, only combine them with participant orientations. They state (Almond & Verba, 1963) that even if subject, participant, and parochial orientations may be contradictory after all is the ideal fusion that creates political stability. Even though participation seems to be the main requirement of democracy, its high degree creates instability. As illustration can be used in any negotiation, everyone’s participation and different opinion create the impossibility to agree. For this reason, Almond and Verba state that we need also subject and parochial orientations.

Nowadays, Germany is considered to be a stable democracy, with a well-developed civic culture. During the last 50 years, massive changes are seen in the German political culture, as the process of Western democratization, democratic peaceful revolution in East followed by the unification and significant changes in the education process, including education about previous mistakes during Hitler’s Third Reich. Thanks to these processes (education, experience, socialization) during the last half-century, political culture is no longer seen as a subject, but as a fusion of all political cultures (civic culture). German political culture is supported by a new form of education toward tolerance and dialogue which helps to maintain participatory elements of the political culture. On the other hand, also stable democracies are experiencing deficits. The main issue of Germany is the differences in experiences and education of citizens in the Western and Eastern parts of Germany. The differences are not insurmountable but still creates contrast, e.g.f.i. in trust toward political institutions or system as such.

3.4. Enthusiasm in West and East, explanation of differences

To a stable democracy or democratic citizen are needed minimal economical security (economy can satisfy citizen’s expectation), democratic structures (constitution based on rule of law and human rights), education toward democratic participation (democratic structure needs citizens/ political actor with the ability to govern within democratic structures) and lastly, the most importantly, support (no support/ trust means no democracy).

Important to realize, shift from EG and WG to FD (Federal Republic of Germany) was not an easy and homogenous process. While Westerners were continuing in democratic development, Easterners “lost their state and with it a part of their identity” (Conradt, 2005, p. 41). As David Conradt (2005, p. 40-41) claims in his comparative study of Germany claims, Easterners had a difficult role to refine themselves and adapt to new values, beliefs, and verities. Also, the situation for East Germans dramatically changed not only politically but also economically and materially.

The nNew united Germany was a different experience for citizens in the West and East. While West experienced mostly positive outcomes, East seen positive, but also negative outcome of the new regime and state. The worst problems were “rising rents, unemployment and anxiety about possible unemployment” (Conradt, 2005, p. 34), in opposite with most popular news as an opportunity to travel, to openly speak about politics and religion, and to enjoy new cars, telephones, and other modern technologies. The significance and strength of the shift may be seen in the numbers of telephone users which “increased from only 30 percent of that in the west in 1991 to over 70 percent in 2001” (Conradt, 2005, p. 34). Such material development and freedom to choose a future job or education contributed to the positive experience from democracy and the longer-perspective developed trust toward regime and institutions.

Nowadays, 84.6 percent of Germans (WG+EG) consider democracy as very or important (World Value Survey, 2020). When dividing Germany into two former states, support in WG is higher with a score of 87.35 percent, in comparison with 78.18 percent in EG. Despite the differences in scaling democracy as the best, the only very minor population from both parts support the replacement of the regime. In other words, even if Westerners confidence in democratic institutions is higher, Easterners are supporting democracy with less enthusiasm, but are not rejecting it. Based on data, only inconsiderable numbers of citizens are rejecting the democratic regime in both parts of Germany, less than 1 percent (World Values Survey, 2020). Given these points, Westerners having a higher enthusiasm for democratic structures and system in general, but Easterners are less enthusiastic, but not reject democratic system. To sum up, West and East have corresponding numbers of distrust with a democratic system and tendency to replace the democratic regime with other forms of governing.

Furthermore, Westerners and Easterners conform with evaluating the performance of government but differ in the expression of their dissatisfaction/ mistrust. To demonstrate, numbers of absolute/ high dissatisfaction with the performance of government in 10.06 percent in EG and 11.07 percent in WG (World Value Survey, 2020). So the level of high dissatisfaction with government is almost the same and also in case of numbers of citizens in the middle of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. The main difference is their expression of dissatisfaction, while Westerners are critiquing parties and leaders, understating that progress may be made only with traditional-democratic instruments. As Rohrschneider & Beck (2002) state, Easterners are more inclined toward totalitarian machinations and governance of a strong leader. Besides, “the term ‘socialism’ differs across the East-West divide: in the East, it is linked to systemic alternatives; in the West, it is primarily linked to the welfare state” ((Rohrschneider & Beck, 2002, p. 54) which presents the continuing legacy of the previous regime with a strong oppressive government in Eastern regions. Because the “reservoir of favorable attitudes that helps members to accept or tolerate output to which they are opposed” (Easton, 1975, pp. 444) is more developed in Western regions, Eastern regions are more favorable towards radical and populist parties.

To conclude, the main causes of these differences are the age of the democratic regime in the West, economical development, and the legacy of the previous regime. Western’s “were exposed to the liberal-democratic constitution since 1949” (Rohrschneider & Beck, 2002, p. 54), while the young generation of Easterners was already educated as participatory, some part of the older generation still lived only a smaller part of life in a democracy. As already mentioned, the experience is a helpful instrument in developing trust toward of the newly formed regime. Another factor helping EG to reach a level of WG was economical development. Easterners are no more second-class citizens, but still have small economical gaps. The last cause is a legacy of the previous regime which is present in the majority of citizens raised in socialism. They compare their current lives with times in the previous regime, focusing on economical security and ideological/ political stability. Conradt in his comparative study of Germany called The German Polity originally published in 2005 summarizes all these causes of differences as the “Wall in People’s head” (p. 41) and most of the economical and political differences were overcome. And now the only difference is an imaginary gap in Eastern’s head which distinguishes them from Westerners. Such “gap between eastern and western Germany will last for at least a generation, or perhaps until the last person born under Communist has passed away” (p. 43). So some scholars claim that material differences between EG and WG are no longer significant and only difference significant for further observation is the so-called “wall in people’s head” (Conradt, 2005, p. 41). This argument provides an alternative explanation that Germany is no longer divided, only a part of the population have a very strong memory of the previous division that enables them to understand Germany as a one unit.

**3.5. Conclusion of Civic Culture’s analysis **

The world constantly changes, but the shift made in Eastern Germany was/ and still is colossal. Eastern Germans showed/are still showing us how quickly society and political culture may change from subject-totalitarian to participant-liberal democratic. World and Europe, mainly post-communist states learn a lesson from the German democratic transition, that even weak democracy/ dictatorship/ oppressive monarchy or totalitarian communist state may become a stable democracy. The ingredients of the transition toward stable democracy are education (education toward participation, critical thinking, and tolerance), economy (economical security is a fundamental status for engagement in democratic life), and working democratic structures and institutions which public trust and support.

Thirty years ago, Richard von Weizsäcker told the public about historical chance and was not far from reality. Germany in 1991 has gained the historic opportunity to create a modern democratic state with fully-developed civic culture, stable economy, and effective institutions. Indeed, it is a success story but needs continuing maintenance for its positive story, because Inglehart & Welzel (2005) argue that “modernization is not irreversible” (p. 42). So a stable democracy is not a final stage unless there is a level of support and ingredients, previously mentioned. But some Easterners still see differences, but how to overcome them? Most of them (economical, democratic, and institutional) have overcome, now there is only the last stage: citizens need to consider themselves as democratic Germans (no longer Easterners second-class citizens). If all Germans would consider themselves as citizens of unified democratic Germany, then the legacy of the wall would only belong to history text-books.

**4. Post-modern Germany, the latest trends in German Politics

4.1. Introduction to analysis of East and West, study of AfD **

The first part of this paper examined the transition from pre-modern society toward a modern industrialized and bureaucratized world. The main finding of this part is the origin of fascism and differences between Eastern and Western routes toward democracy. Later, the second part observed the journey of two Germanies after the Second World War and summarized the process of unification. The main finding of this part is the explanation of differences between West and East which is more meant (because of different experience) than actual drastic economic and political differences. Consequently, there are no two types of Germans (Westerner’s an Easterner’s), there is only one type of German with a different length of a democratic experience. Nowadays, Germany is a highly-developed country with a fully-established civic culture with enough participation of society. The third part of this paper studies the latest phenomenon of post-modernization, a transition in which fine health care and education are more valuable than economic growth. As Ronald Inglehart (1997) states, a country needs to reach a certain level of socio-economic development for the shift from modernization into post-modernization, for giving higher priority to the values of democracy, tolerance, and solidarity (post-material values) than to economical-materialist interests (pp. 449-450). In the case of Germany, changes in society are increasing the popularity of radical views and support for right-wing and left-wing populism. While the new generations of Western German’s are post-modernized citizens thanks to socioeconomic development with an emphasis on values as solidarity and tolerance, generations of Eastern German’s are lost and scared offrom changes in society, mainly because of lack of democratic education, missing process of reconciliation with fascism and social insecurity. The third part of this case study analyses differences between East and West from the perspective of the popularity of radical values, when the East is more radical and not fully adapted into a post-modern society.

**4.2. Story of German post-modernization **

A half-century ago many scholars understoodunderstand modernization as the ultimate and final process of human development, but the situation during the second half of the 20th century quickly had changed their hypothesis. Scholars discovered a new phenomenon, post-modernization, a transition that starts after modernization reaches a certain level. Ronald Inglehart argues in his article Modernization, Post-modernization and Changing Perceptions of Risk (1997) argues that “modernization is not the final stage of history” (p. 449) and is only thea first step toward the modern world. In post-modernization theory, modernization is understood as a process of economical (industrialization) and political development (bureaucratization). The major aim of these changes is to achieve economical success from the perspective of an individual and to achieve a coordinative organization of power and capital. Simply, the point of modernization is to use finances for the well-being of an individual and the state. As Inglehart points out, (1997) this process is characterized by the shift of the values “from traditional, usually religious values, to rational-legal values in economic, political and social life” (Inglehart, 1997, p. 449).

While modernists sawseen the economical growth as the most important factor of development, post-modernists understand economical growth as part of the success. Winner of the 1998 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel (known as Nobel Prize in Economic Science) Amartya Sen (2001) understoodobserved the GNP per capita as an important factor of development but gives equal importance to “social and economical arrangements as well as political and civic rights” (p. 3). In other words, not only the quality of the economy but also the quality of education, health care, and human rights are the crucialjudging factors for the evaluation of the overall quality of life in a specific country. So, according to post-modernists, a successful country is a country highly socioeconomically developed and with established liberal democracy. Simply, a post-modernist country is a country where all citizens are educated, economically-secured, and healthy. Sen (2001) calls them “political freedoms (in the form of free speech and elections), social opportunities (in the form of education and health facilities) and economic facilities (in the form of opportunities for participation in trade and production)” (p. 11).

Additionally, post-modernist shifts influence political culture, mainly the voting -behavior and public -opinion. Inglehart and Welzel (2005) argue that the post -modernist developments “tends to make people more secular, tolerant, and trusting and to place more emphasis on self-expression, participation, and the quality of life” (p. 46). Briefly, the priorities of a new generation are different, they are post-modern/ post-materialist. While the previous generation was asking the existential question connected with their economical-insecurity and their political stances were corresponding to their economical class and role. In opposite, the political stances of a new generation are more independent and complex (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). It would be a mistake to state that the economical interests of individuals are no longer relevant in a political debate, they are relevant but only as one fraction of a complex set of issues. The transition of values and shift into a post-modern society brings contradictory outcomes, from the increasing support for humanistic values as acceptance of human rights, solidarity, and tolerance, to rising skepticism, authoritative populism and for some groups also rising fear from list of “true culture” (Olsen, 2018, p. 78). Even though we are richer, healthier, and freer than ever before, some groups are not satisfied and call for a radical change.

**4.3. East needs Alternative, explanation of Eastern radicalism **

“Germany’s HDI value for 2019 is 0.947— which put the country in the very high human development category—positioning it at 6th rank out of 189 countries and territories. Between 1990 and 2019, Germany’s HDI value increased from 0.808 to 0.947, an increase of 17.2 percent” (UNDP, 2020, p. 2). The answer to why the very socioeconomically -developed (post-modernized) country has highly unsatisfied citizens with a tendency to overthrow the regime is more complicated. In the case of Germany, there are two main explanations of the AfD’s success and twice higher popularity of right-wing populism in Eastern regions of Germany: the first one is a so-called “losers of modernization” thesis and the other is the tradition of radical -votes in EG.

Losers of modernization thesis suggests that “those that suffer from recent economic change, for instance, the unskilled and low-skilled (manual) workers” (Schwander & Manow, 2017, p. 2) are far-more suitable to be a voter of political extreme (such as AfD) (Schwander & Manow, 2017, p. 2). This social group experienced a more turbulent transition from pre-modern into modern society because of unsophisticated education experienced a more turbulent transition from pre-modern into modern society. And when they were prepared for a modern world, the world was shifting to a started to be a post-modern world. Western Germans were successful in this aspect, have invested in the education process, created a working social program for unemployed and lower-income groupsr, and improved public infrastructure (Betz, 1990, p. 240 - 245). In brief, Western Germans provided their societythis group with a fine infrastructure (for them and their children) reciprocally for their good work. Additionally, their children were raised in a new educational system, a system where also unskilled and low-skilled (manual) workers are prepared to be participatory citizens in elections. Equally important, is the aspect of a political memory of fascism and a strict ban on different far-right and far-left movements in WG during the 80s. After all, education and experience formed potential far-right or far-left voters more democratically and achieve a low level of support for these parties, deeply under the electoral threshold.

Eastern regions of Germany are abundant in right-wing and left-wing populism in comparison with Western Germany for their shorter democratic experience and the tradition of “tradition of radical right ideas” (Schwander & Manow, 2017, p. 19). “In the 2017 general elections, the AfD won 12.6% of the votes and is now the third-largest group in the 19th Bundestag. The AfD did extremely well in eastern Germany, especially in Saxony where it won 27% of the votes” (Berning, 2017, p. 18). There are two possible explanations for the success of of AfD in the Eastern’s success of AfD. First one, is the already mentioned thesis of losers of modernization, but Schwander & Manow (2017) argue that “modernization thesis bears little relevance” (p. 19) for the explanation of different popularity of far-right parties in EG (p. 19). But they state that the main point is in a “tradition of extreme-right voting in certain districts in which the AfD prospers today” (p. 16). So the second explanation is a tradition or experience with radical and extremist political ideas and stances. The main difference between WG and EG extremist parties is in the level of drawing consequences of fascism and other extremist ideologies (in the case of EG, communism). As Olsen (2018), Weisskircher (2020) and others state, WG condemned fascism and was very sensitive to any radical stances in politics. After all, WG during four decades WG thanks to socioeconomic development and education (education toward democracy and based on condemning of fascism) eliminated/ diminisdhed thediseased reservoir of radical and extremist values, in oppositione to EG.

Equally important, AfD is based on “nativism, the belief that a state should comprise ‘natives’ and that ‘nonnatives’ are to be treated with hostility” (Olsen, 2018, p. 78). The increasing popularity of AfD reflects crises and changes in society. As Inglehart & Wenzel (2005) suggest changes in our society from modern into the post-modern world are accompanied by the rising attentiveness of society, when “politics become less and less a game restricted to elites” (p. 21). Post-modernization brings different outcomes, from positive aspects as rising support of tolerance, solidarity, and equality, to negative aspects as a creation of more radical stances in some groups because of their inability to live in a different world, the world they do no longer understand. It is not surprising, that supporters of AfD and other radical parties are feeling that their “culture and language is being lost” (Olsen, 2018, p. 74-75). Supporters of AfD in Germany see massive changes, including dramatic changes of values in the youngest generation, an influx of cultures, unprecedented socioeconomic, and technological development. And in such situations, are slogans as “The East Rises Up!” (Weisskircher, 2020, p. 617) are more easily understandable than a complex explanation of the positive aspects of modernization and post-modernization. It is important to realize that some men and women lived in a world based on tradition and common procedures without any further doubt, but that world has changed. The only thing they want is a return of their former world, and AfD is offering that.

4.4. Conclusion onf post-modernization

To conclude, the briefest explanation of German’s lesson of post-modernization is to use the quote from 1959’s Academy Awarded Movie Some Like It Hot: "Well, nobody's perfect.” (Wilder, 1959). Even the 6th best country around the world, based on the HDI Index experience rising populism and the popularity of anti-system far-right parties. There is no signal cause and one general explanation for the whole of Germany. The western story is successful mainly thanks to the execution of a previous fascist regime and massive socioeconomic development. On the opposite, the Eastern story after unification is more turbulent because of the living memory of the previous communist regime, traditional support of radical values, and lost-identity (lost state and lost culture) from their perspective.

5. Conclusion of a case study

All things considered, Germany has changed. This case study provides a detailed analysis of these changes, from the Prussian absolute monarchy, through Weimar’s Republic, Third Reich, Cold War’s occupation until the unification. Besides, this paper shows that the historical route may be changed and the main aggressor may become the leader of tolerance, freedom, and democracy. And as this paper states: it needs time, education, and socioeconomic development. “Unity and justice and freedom, are the safeguards of fortune. Flourish in the radiance of this fortune, fFlourish, German fatherland!” (Deutscher Bundestag, n.d.) 6. References

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